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Summary 
 
This policy brief summarises, with some limited comments, the Provisional Findings (PFs) and 
Notice of Possible Remedies published by the CMA on 22nd October 2015. The CMA 
commenced this inquiry in November 2014 and the final report is due by May 2016. 
 
The investigation covers the provision of personal and business current accounts and also 
some wider aspects of SME banking across the UK.  Despite earlier comments that Scotland 
might be a separate market for SME lending, the whole of GB is treated as a single market for 
all aspects of this report.  The SME sector is of major importance to the Scottish economy, 
accounting for over 99% of all business enterprises. 
 
In the PFs the Group set up by the CMA provisionally determine that as a result of certain 
features of the markets investigated, there are adverse effects on competition (AECs).  
Therefore they propose a number of remedies to offset the features identified and to reduce the 
consumer detriment resulting from the AECs. 
 
The key findings are summed up in this quote from the report: - µ7KHFRPELQDWLRQRI WKHVH
features means that there is weak customer response to differences in prices or service quality 
and established banks have incumbency advantages.  As a result, the incentives on banks to 
FRPSHWHRQSULFHVVHUYLFHTXDOLW\DQGRULQQRYDWLRQDUHUHGXFHG¶ 
 
The proposed remedies focus on means of encouraging greater consumer response and better 
incentivising banks to compete.  The CMA is not recommending any structural changes nor the 
HQGRI µ)UHH-if-in-FUHGLW¶FXUUHQWDFFRXQWV  There are specific remedies to help support SME 
OHQGLQJDQGµUH-HQJLQHHU¶the process of accessing loans. 
 
The PFs and proposed remedies are currently out to consultation, with comments required by 
20 November 2015. 
 
                                                          
1 Jeremy Peat was RBS Group Chief Economist from 1993  ? 2005. He was a Panel Member of the 
Competition Commission (the predecessor of the CMA) from 2005  ? 2014; and has since been a Panel 
Member of the CMA. This note is written from a purely personal and professional perspective and he 
has not been involved at the CMA in any aspect of the current banking inquiry. 
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I Introduction 
 
In November 2014 the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) commenced an inquiry into 
elements of the UK banking industry.  This inquiry was to consider aspects of the retail banking 
sector in the United Kingdom, namely the provision of current accounts including overdrafts to 
personal current account customers (PCAs) and the provision of a wider range of services to 
small and medium scale businesses (SMEs). 
 
As a former Group Chief Economist at RBS (1993-2005),I have been involved in a range of 
studies of the UK banking sector, going back to that set up under Sir Donald Cruickshank in 
2000.  In my view, this latest inquiry really does matter and potentially could result in real 
benefits for individuals and SMEs across Scotland, and the rest of the UK.  Therefore it merits 
close attention at this stage from all interested parties if the maximum benefits are to be 
extracted from the detailed, informed and objective work undertaken by the CMA.  Whilst they 
are not recommendiQJGUDPDWLFVWHSVVXFKDVUHVWUXFWXULQJWKHVHFWRURUEDQQLQJµ)UHH-if-in-
Credit¶FXUUHQWDFFRXQWVsome significant remedies are under active consideration. 
 
As is standard for inquiries of this type, a group of five CMA Panel Members was appointed to 
be responsible for the inquiry.  This Group is supported by a strong professional team, including 
inter alia economists, lawyers and business analysts. The Group was charged with 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQDVWRZKHWKHUµany feature, or combination of features, of each relevant market 
prevents, restricts or distorts competition in connection with the supply or acquisition of any 
JRRGVRUVHUYLFHVLQWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPRUDSDUWRIWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶. 
 
If the Group were to determine in its final report that such a feature or features exist, then they 
will have found that there is one or more AEC ± an Adverse Effect on Competition.  The next 
step would be for the Group to determine what action is then appropriate and proportionate and 
to find in favour of some package of µUHPHGLHV¶ either to be implemented by the CMA or 
recommended to other bodies. 
 
Earlier this year, the Group SXEOLVKHGDQµ$QQRWDWHG,VVXHV6WDWHPHQW¶JLYLQJVRPHLQGLFDWLRQ
of their direction of travel.  But they have now reached a crucial stage and have published their 
Preliminary Findings (PFs)2 along with a Notice of Possible Remedies.  It is these documents 
which are the subject of this note. 
 
                                                          
2 This note is based upon a full summary of PFs published on 22nd October ? ‘ZĞƚĂŝůĂŶŬŝŶŐDĂƌŬĞƚ
Investigation; summary of provisional findings ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞǀŝĂ the CMA website. The full version 
of PFs, including some 30 appendices, will be available shortly. However, the summary is more than 
sufficient to understand their findings and possible remedies. 
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At this time (November 2015), the Group is seeking comments from all interested parties on 
their PFs and on their list of possible remedies.  Over the next couple of months they will hold 
formal hearings with key players, no doubt including the major banks, challenger banks and 
representatives of consumers and small and medium size enterprises.  These hearings will be 
transcribed and summaries, excluding any confidential information, will be made available on 
the CMA website. 
 
Following consultation, hearings and further consideration, the final report will be published in 
May 2016, 18 months after the inquiry commenced.  This report ZLOOLQFOXGHWKH*URXS¶VILQDO
views on AECs and, subject to their being one or more AEC, a final list of proposed remedies3.  
It is important to note that this will be the final report, and will not be subject to (for example) 
Ministerial approval.  However, it will of course be subject to due legal process and there could 
be (for example) appeals by parties, initially to the Competition Appeals Tribunal. 
 
 
II The findings 
 
At earlier stages of the GrouS¶VZRUNWKHUHZHUHVXJJHVWLRQVWKDW WKH\VDZWKHSRVVLELOLW\RI
greater competition problems in the SME banking market in Scotland than elsewhere in Great 
Britain (they are considering Northern Ireland somewhat separately) because of more limited 
competition for this market north of the border.  However, in their latest document they treat the 
whole of GB as one market for personal and SME banking purposes.  To quote their report: -  
 
µIn relation to Scotland, while there were some differences in market share in 
Scotland, these were not sufficient to suggest that Scotland should be viewed 
as a separate geographic market to England and Wales.¶ 
 
Therefore, subject to any re-consideration of this finding, the analysis and possible AECs apply 
across GB and any remedies finally agreed would apply equally across GB. 
 
 
,QWKH*URXS¶VLVVXHVVWDWHPHQWWKH\ had identified the following causes for concern: -  
 
µLWKDWWKHUHDUHLPSHGLPHQWVWRFXVWRPHUV¶DELOLW\WRVKRSDURXQGFKRRVHDQGVZLWFKSURGXFWV
and suppliers resulting in weak incentives on banks to compete; 
(ii) that the level of concentration [in the markets] is giving rise to market power leading to 
adverse outcomes for customers; and  
(iii) that there are barriers to entry and/or expansion leading WRZRUVHRXWFRPHVIRUFXVWRPHUV¶ 
 
 
                                                          
3 A separate note on possible remedies has been published alongside PFs. See note 4 below. 
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Between issues statement and Preliminary Findings (PFs) these issues have been subject to 
further consultation and investigation.  That work included wide-ranging customer surveys of 
both personal and SME customers.  As a result of these further investigations the issues have 
not gone away!  Indeed the formal position in these PFs is that the Group has provisionally 
IRXQGWKDWµthere are features of the relevant markets, which alone or in combination, prevent, 
restrict or distort competition in the supply of PCAs in the UK and in the supply of certain retail 
banking services to SMEs in the UK such that there is an adverse effect on competition (AEC)¶. 
They have found AECs and therefore it behoves the group to consider what actions might be 
required to offset the negative effects on competition and hence mitigate to some degree the 
consequent consumer detriment. 
So far as personal current account holders are concerned, the features identified which 
together lead to this finding of AECs are as follows: -  
1 Barriers to accessing and assessing information on PCA charges and service quality 
2 Barriers to switching PCAs 
3 Low levels of customer engagement; and 
4 Incumbency advantages 
Turning to the SME market, the Group again found a combination of features underlying an 
AEC.  They found separate but similar AECs for Business Current Accounts and the provision 
of SME lending. The features identified are: - 
1 Linkages between Personal Current Accounts (PCAs) and Business Current 
Accounts (BCAs) 
2 Barriers to accessing and assessing information on BCA charges and service quality 
3 Barriers to switching BCAs 
4 Low levels of customer engagement; and 
5 Incumbency advantages 
 
For both personal and SME customers the Group states that: - 
 
µ7KH FRPELQDWLRQ RI WKHVH IHDWXUHV PHDQV WKDW WKHUH LV ZHDN FXVWRPHU
response to differences in prices or service quality and established banks have 
incumbency advantages. As a result, the incentives on banks to compete on 
SULFHVVHUYLFHTXDOLW\DQGRULQQRYDWLRQDUHUHGXFHG¶ 
 
7KHUHDUHUHJXODUUHIHUHQFHVWKURXJKWKH&0$3)VGRFXPHQWWRµLQFXPEHQF\DGYDQWDJHV¶IRU
WKH ORQJHVWDEOLVKHGEDQNVDVD UHVXOWRIZHDNFXVWRPHU UHVSRQVH UHVXOWLQJ LQ µEDUULHUV WR
HQWU\¶VRIDUDVDFWXDODQGSRWHQWLDOQHZHQWUDQWVDUHFRQFHUQHG  Within this context there is 
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particular emphasis on SME banking, where the CMA suggest that SMEs tend to open business 
accounts at the same bank as they hold their personal accounts ± and then tend to move on to 
seeking any required business loans from the same bank once more. 
 
To quote further from the report, so as to provide a good indication as to where the Group is 
looking for remedial action, please note the following: - 
 
x µWe found that while banks appearing to offer lower average prices and/or better quality 
tend to have been gaining market share this was at a very slow pace.µ 
 
x µ«competition is focused on acquiring the primary banking relationship and  
targeting more affluent customers¶ 
 
x µSME engagement was relatively low both at start-up where many SMEs did not 
compare banks and after the end of the free banking period where few SMEs searched 
or switched.µ 
 
x µ%DQNV¶DFTXLVLWLRQDQGUHWHQWLRQVWUDWHJLHVWHQGWRIRFXVRQODUJHU60(V (turnover of 
above £2 million)¶. 
 
 
III The remedies under consideration 
 
A consultation document covering possible remedies has been published at the same time as 
the PFs.4  Again comments are requested.  Going forward, consideration of remedies will 
continue to be related to consideration of features of the market and AECs.  If the view on AECs 
were to change, then this could influence the view on remedies.  Obviously, no AEC would 
mean no remedies.  Any change in either the features of the market or the AECs would lead to 
re-consideration of remedies.  Possible remedies will be one topic on the agenda for hearings 
with interested parties. 
 
As noted in their consultation document, as is standard for CMA inquiries into sectors µThe 
CMA will consider how comprehensively the possible remedy options ± whether individually or 
as a package ± address the AEC and/or its resulting detrimental effects on customers, and 
whether they are effective and proportionate¶. 
 
On this occasion, what is excluded from possible remedies is attracting as much notice as what 
is included.  Some commentatRUVDQGVRPHIURPWKHµ&KDOOHQJHU¶EDQNVKDYHDUJXHGWKDWWKH
µ)UHH-if-in-FUHGLW¶ DSSURDFK E\ WKH PDMRU EDQNV WR FXUUHQW DFFRXQWV GLVWRUWV WKH PDUNHW  
Provision of a current account PD\EHµIUHH¶ WRWKHFXVWRPHUZKRVWD\V LQFUHGLWEXW LW is not 
                                                          
4  ‘Retail banking market investigation; notice of possible remedies ?; this is again available on the CMA 
website. 
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costless to the provider, even if a positive balance is maintained at all times.  Each transaction 
on that account costs the provider something!  For banks to achieve the required profitability 
and return on capital, someone has to meet all costs.  Losses related WRµIUHH¶FXUUHQWDFFRXQWV
will have to be offset by higher than normal margins/profits in other product areas.  There is 
clearly a distortion of the market at work here.  However, the CMA has determined that the 
SURYLVLRQRIVXFKµ)UHH-if-in-FUHGLW¶FXUUHnt accounts is not a sufficient distortion to result in a 
requirement for intervention. 
 
Also the Group has determined, at this stage, that no structural remedies are justified.  Some 
such changes resulted from the Independent Commission on Banking chaired by Sir John 
Vickers in 2011. 
 
It should be noted that the CMA Group is free to change its view on remedies as well as on 
AECs in the period between PFs and its final report.  But introducing major new ± and potentially 
contentious ± remedies at that late stage would be unusual. 
 
Below are the remedies that the Group recommends for consideration at this stage ± broken 
down between remedies to cover the AECs for PCAs and BCAs and then those for the AECs 
related to SME lending.  It should be noted that the list of possible remedies is lengthy and the 
remedies proposed in many instances appear highly technical.  Nevertheless the importance of 
the concerns raised is such that the list of remedies merits careful consideration. 
 
There are major costs to consumer and SMEs related to limited choice and switching so far as 
current accounts are concerned.  Will consumers and consumer organisations agree that the 
possible remedies set out below could reduce these costs and work towards a more efficient 
and customer-friendly banking system? 
 
The SME sector is of particular importance to the Scottish economy.  In 2014, there were 
332,720 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operating in Scotland, providing an 
estimated 1.1 million jobs.  SMEs accounted for 99.3% of all private sector enterprises, 54.8% 
of private sector employment and 37.9% of private sector turnover. 
 
A major issue often discussed in Scotland is with regard to possible constraints on SME access 
to loans and the way in which this may inhibit investment and innovation ± the very life blood of 
a successful, high-productivity, efficient and competitive SME sector.  Could the proposed 
remedies for SME lending really result in a dramatic change (for the better) in the means of 
SMEs acquiring loans, as the CMA report suggests?  Or is something more substantive 
warranted? 
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The Group has proposed a range of possible remedies to deal with the issues identified for 
Personal Current Accounts and Business Accounts.  These are categorised as follows: - 
 
x Measures to promote engagement and prompt switching between current account 
providers. 
 
Remedy 1 ± Prompt customers to review their PCA or BCA provider at times when they 
may have a higher propensity to consider a change 
 
Remedy 2 ± Increase public awareness of the potential savings or rewards that could 
EHREWDLQHGE\FKDQJLQJRQH¶VFXUUHQWDFFRXQWSURYLGHUDQGRIWKHEHQHILWVRIXVLQJWKH
Current Account Switch Service to do so in terms of security and convenience 
 
 
x Measures to facilitate comparisons between providers 
 
Remedy 3 ± Facilitate price comparisons between providers by making customer-
specific transaction data more easily available and usable, including by PCWs  
 
Remedy 4 ± A PCW [Price Comparison Website] for SMEs 
 
Remedy 5 ± Enable consumers and SMEs to make comparisons between current 
account providers on the basis of their service quality 
 
 
x Measures to make BCA opening easier 
 
Remedy 6 ± Standardise and simplify BCA opening procedures 
 
 
x Measures to improve the switching process 
 
Remedy 7 ± Make it easier for prospective PCA customers to find out, before initiating 
the switching process, whether the overdraft facilities they were seeking would be 
available from another provider 
 
Remedy 8 ± Require payments into the old account to be redirected into the new one 
for a longer period than at present 
 
Remedy 9 ± Require banks to retain and provide ex-customers, on demand, with details 
of their BCA and PCA transactions over the five years prior to their account closure 
 
Remedy 10 ± require BACS to transfer continuous payment authorities on debit cards 
when switching through CASS 
 
Remedy 11 ± Require all banks to support the partial switching service and to provide 
an equivalent guarantee to that offered as part of CASS 
 
Remedy 12 ± Changes to CASS governance 
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At this stage in their remedies document the CMA states that it believes that: - µThe remedies 
we have set out here could each individually have a beneficial impact on the AECs we have 
provisionally found in the PCA and BCA markets.  However, we believe their impact in 
FRPELQDWLRQDVDSDFNDJHLVOLNHO\WREHJUHDWHUWKDQWKHLUHIIHFWLQLVRODWLRQ¶  This emphasis 
on the value of remedies as a package is an important feature of the recommendations at this 
stage. 
 
The remedies report then goes on to discuss potential remedies for the difficulties they have 
identified so far as SME lending is concerned.  The features causing problems and hence AECs 
are set out above.  It is these AECs which the remedies must aim to remove or substantially 
diminish. 
 
 Remedy 13 ± Data sharing with credit reference agencies 
 
 Remedy 14 ± Commercial open data and data sharing proposals 
 
 Remedy 15 ± Require banks to provide a loans price and eligibility indicator 
 
As with the set of remedies proposed for the AECs related to PCAs and BCAs, the CMA 
EHOLHYHVWKDWWKHVHUHPHGLHVUHODWHGWR605OHQGLQJZLOOµtend to reinforce each other and be 
more effective as a package¶.  In addition the Group believes that these SME lending remedies 
would work wHOO ZLWK UHPHGLHVDQG  DERYHDQG µtaken as a whole, may enable a re-
HQJLQHHULQJRIWKHSURFHVVZKHUHE\60(VVHHNDQGDFTXLUHORDQV¶. 
 
It will be of interest to see if SMEs and relevant business organisations such as the Federation 
of Small Businesses DQGWKH,QVWLWXWHRI'LUHFWRUVDJUHHWKDWDEHQHILFLDOµUH-HQJLQHHULQJ¶RIWKH
process for acquiring loans could result from these remedies. 
 
 
IV Next steps 
 
The deadline for comments on both the provisional findings and the notice of possible remedies 
is 20 November 2015.  The contact address is retailbanking@cma.gsi.gov.uk.  Under the 
guidance when the CMA was established in place of the Competition Commission, the 
maximum time allowed for these sector inquiries was reduced from 2 years to 18 months.  
Therefore the final report is due to be published in May 2016 at the latest.  Further information 
is available on the CMA website; and more papers and news on developments will be found 
there over the coming 6 or 7 months. 
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